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Non-technical summary 
This paper investigates the impact of an individual’s level of locus of control, a concept commonly 
used in social psychology (Rotter, 1966), on educational choices and wages. We establish that 
more internal individuals, i.e., who believe that reinforcement in life comes from their own actions 
instead of being determined by luck or destiny, earn higher wages. However, the positive effect of 
a more internal locus of control only translates into labor income via the channel of education: 
once schooling is controlled for, the impact of locus of control on wages vanishes.   
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), we address the problem of 
measurement error by extracting a latent factor reflecting locus of control. In addition, we account 
for the problem of reverse causality and truncated life-cycle data in that we combine information 
on both young individuals, who have not yet entered the labor market, and on older, working-age 
individuals. Our estimation approach follows the work by Heckman et al. (2006b), Hansen et al. 
(2004) and Carneiro et al. (2003) in that we use Markov chain Monte Carlo methods to simulate 
the parameters of the model. Specifically, we use a Gibbs sampler with flat priors that sequentially 
draws the parameters of interest from their respective conditional distributions. Furthermore, we 
build on a strategy developed in Cunha et al. (2005), which allows us to retrieve the distribution of 
locus of control from a sample of young individuals, and to estimate its impact on outcomes in a 
sample of working-age individuals. Producing identification of different parts of the likelihood 
using different samples, we are able to correct for potential biases that arise due to reverse 
causality and spurious correlation, and to measure the impact of premarket locus of control on later 
outcomes. 
We find that locus of control is an important predictor of the decision to obtain higher education. 
Furthermore, we find that premarket locus of control, defined as locus of control measured at the 
time of schooling—before the individual enters the labor market—does not significantly affect 
later wages after controlling for education decisions. In light of the  existing literature, which finds 
mostly positive effects of contemporaneous locus of control measures on wages, this indicates that 
it is important to distinguish between premarket skills and those that are already influenced by 
labor market experience and age. Last, simulation of our model shows that moving individuals 
from the first to the last decile of the locus of control distribution significantly shifts the 
distribution of schooling choices, thus indirectly affecting later wages. 
 
 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den Einfluss von subjektiven Kontrollüberzeugungen für 
Bildungsentscheidungen und den Lohn. Nach dem Konzept von Rotter (1966) messen 
Kontrollüberzeugungen, ob Individuen im Allgemeinen eher von einem Ursache–
Wirkungszusammenhang im Handeln ausgehen, oder ob sie das Geschehen eher als von Glück 
oder Schicksal bestimmt ansehen. Bei stärker ausgeprägten Kontrollüberzeugungen dominieren 
Ursache–Wirkungszusammenhänge, bei schwächer ausgeprägten Kontrollüberzeugungen 
dominiert die Schicksalsvorstellung. Die Studie zeigt erstens, dass eine stärkere Ausprägung von 
Kontrollüberzeugungen mit höheren Löhnen verbunden ist. Zweitens kommt die Analyse zum 
Schluss, dass dies nicht in erster Linie auf eine höhere direkte Produktivität am Arbeitsmarkt 
zurückzuführen ist. Vielmehr ist der höhere Lohn ein Ergebnis der höheren Bildung der 
Erwerbstätigen mit stärker ausgeprägten Kontrollüberzeugungen. 
Die der Analyse zugrunde gelegten Daten entstammen Stichproben aus dem Sozio-
Oekonomischen Panel (SOEP). Mit Faktorstrukturmodellen und bayesianischen Methoden werden 
die in der Literatur zwar häufig diskutierten, aber selten untersuchten Messfehler und 
Endogenitätsprobleme angegangen. Statt die subjektiven Kontrollüberzeugungen selbst zu 
verwenden, werden Faktorstrukturmodelle eingesetzt, die den Gehalt der subjektiven Angaben in 
allen zehn Antworten auf den statistischen Kern kondensieren.  
Um sowohl eine potentielle umgekehrte Kausalität als auch eine Scheinkorrelation ausschließen zu 
können, werden unterschiedliche Teile der Wahrscheinlichkeitsfunktion aus einer Stichprobe 
Siebzehnjähriger mit den Arbeitsmarktergebnissen junger Erwachsener kombiniert. Mit diesem 
Verfahren gelingt es, das Problem der zensierten Lebenszyklen statistisch zu lösen. Der 
unverzerrte Einfluss der Kontrollüberzeugungen, die das Individuum vor dem Eintritt in das 
Erwerbsleben hatte, wird extrahiert. Ziel ist es, den Effekt, der noch nicht durch vorangegangene 
Arbeitsmarkterlebnisse verzerrt ist, abzuschätzen. Dies wird mit der Verbindung der beiden 
Stichproben erreicht.  
Unsere Ergebnisse verdeutlichen, dass die höheren Löhne von Erwerbstätigen im Alter zwischen 
25 und 35 Jahren mit besser ausgeprägten Kontrollüberzeugungen letztlich auf eine bessere 
Bildung zurückzuführen sind. Jugendliche, die im Alter von siebzehn Jahren besser ausgeprägte 
Kontrollüberzeugungen haben, haben auch eine qualitativ bessere Bildung. Wenn dieser 
Zusammenhang kontrolliert wird, tendiert der direkte Einfluss der Kontrollüberzeugungen auf den 
Lohn gegen Null. Methodisch zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass psychometrische Maße eine 
wertvolle Ergänzung zu den sozio-ökonomischen Variablen sind, da sie wichtige 
Erklärungsbeiträge für die Bildungsentscheidungen und das Arbeitsmarktgeschehen leisten.  
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Abstract
This paper establishes that individuals with an internal locus of control, i.e., who
believe that reinforcement in life comes from their own actions instead of being de-
termined by luck or destiny, earn higher wages. However, this positive effect only
translates into labor income via the channel of education. Factor structure models
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so doing, we are able to correct for potential biases that arise due to reverse causality
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1 Introduction
Does it make a difference if you think you can make a difference? Will it affect your decision
making, or even your productivity? In response to such kinds of questions, the economic
literature has recently come to acknowledge the considerable importance of personality traits
in explaining education choices, as well as a large variety of labor market outcomes. The
present paper focuses on locus of control, one dimension of personality that measures the
extent to which individuals believe that what happens to them in life is related to their own
actions and decisions, or on the contrary to fate and luck. We contribute to the existing
literature on personality traits by investigating the impact of locus of control on wages, while
making a distinction between the direct—or productive—impact of locus of control, and the
indirect—or behavioral—impact that works through education decisions.
We find that locus of control is an important predictor of the decision to obtain higher
education. Furthermore, we find that premarket locus of control, defined as locus of control
measured at the time of schooling—before the individual enters the labor market—does
not significantly affect later wages after controlling for education decisions. In light of the
existing literature, which finds mostly positive effects of contemporaneous locus of control
measures on wages, this indicates that it is important to distinguish between premarket skills
and those that are already influenced by labor market experience and age. Last, simulation
of our model shows that moving individuals from the first to the last decile of the locus of
control distribution significantly shifts the distribution of schooling choices, thus indirectly
affecting later wages.
From a methodological point of view, there are two major econometric problems at
stake in the economic literature on personality traits: measurement error and endogeneity
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Borghans et al., 2008). First, measurement error arises because
certain traits or characteristics are measured by questions or tests that are imperfect proxies
of the true latent ability. Yet, in general, most psychological measures are designed to
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capture a particular latent trait or skill, such that factor analytical approaches can be used
to distinguish true latent abilities from measurement error (Borghans et al., 2008; Heckman
et al., 2006b; Hansen et al., 2004). Second, endogeneity arises in the study of the impact
of locus of control on labor market outcomes for two reasons. On the one hand, the results
may be flawed by reverse causality, as (anticipated) labor market outcomes may affect locus
of control (e.g., see Trzcinski and Holst, 2010; Gottschalk, 2005). For this reason, locus of
control measures may reflect, rather than cause, the outcomes they are supposed to predict
(Borghans et al., 2008). In this case, the coefficient on locus of control is biased, because
of nonzero covariance between the measures and the error term. On the other hand, both
outcomes and measures may be affected by past labor market experiences, which are usually
not accounted for. The consequence is, again, an overestimation of the locus of control
coefficient due to spurious correlation.
In the literature, four main strategies have been adopted to address this endogeneity
issue. First, Duncan and Morgan (1981) and Duncan and Dunifon (1998) using the PSID,
extract measures of personality traits as measured 15-25 years prior to earnings. A similar
strategy has been adopted by Heckman et al. (2006b), who use locus of control measurements
in the NLSY taken at age 14-22 to explain later outcomes. Second, Bowles et al. (2001),
using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSYW), employ contemporary
measurements of locus of control, which they purge of past wage influences. Third, Osborne
(2000) uses past skills to instrument for contemporaneous skill measures. Last, Cunha and
Heckman (2008) explicitly model development and accumulation of skills as a technology of
skill formation, in which investments in one period affect the productivity of investments
in subsequent periods. However, their focus is mainly on early childhood development of
skills, and not on the impact of labor market experiences and various life-time shocks on
skill development and income.
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Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), we address the problem of
measurement error by extracting a latent factor reflecting locus of control. In addition, we
account for the problem of reverse causality and truncated life-cycle data in that we combine
information on both young individuals, who have not yet entered the labor market, and on
older, working-age individuals. Our estimation approach follows the work by Heckman et al.
(2006b), Hansen et al. (2004), Carneiro et al. (2003) in that we use Markov chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods to simulate the parameters of the model. Specifically, we use a
Gibbs sampler with flat priors that sequentially draws the parameters of interest from their
respective conditional distributions. Furthermore, we build on a strategy developed in Cunha
et al. (2005), which allows us to retrieve the distribution of locus of control from a sample of
young individuals, and to estimate its impact on outcomes in a sample of older individuals.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we apply novel econometric methods
and show that Bayesian factor structure models can be a solution to endogeneity problems
if researchers are confronted with truncated life cycle data, as is very often the case in the
fields of personality and economics. Second, embedding our empirical results in a simple
theoretical framework, we establish that locus of control only affects the psychic cost of
education but is not directly rewarded on the labor market of young professionals.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the existing literature
on locus of control. In Section 3, a simple framework is introduced to help understand
the potential impact of locus of control on education decisions and labor market outcomes.
Section 4 describes our estimation strategy relying on data set combination to identify the
full likelihood. The Bayesian approach used to sample the parameters of interest is outlined,
and an overview of the data is provided. Section 5 presents the results of our analysis.
Section 6 concludes.
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2 Locus of Control
Since the seminal works of Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964), human capital is defined as
the stock of knowledge and personal abilities an individual possesses, and is perceived as a
factor of production that can be improved through education, training and experience. The
focus usually lies on estimating returns to education, training, experience or cognitive skills
(Psacharopoulos, 1981; Card, 1999; Heckman et al., 2006a).1 However, this concept mainly
refers to the cognitive abilities of an individual, while more recently other facets of human
capital have come to the forefront. Bowles and Gintis (1976) were among the first to point
out what seems intuitively obvious: economic success is only partly determined by cognitive
abilities and knowledge acquired in schools. Personality, incentive-enhancing preferences
and socialization are other important components of human capital (Heckman et al., 2006b;
Heineck and Anger, 2010).2 Furthermore, a vast literature in experimental economics is
currently emerging, which analyzes the economic impact of risk aversion, reciprocity, self-
confidence and time preference (Dohmen et al., 2010; Falk et al., 2006; Frey and Meier,
2004).
We decide to focus on locus of control, one of the measures of personality traits that is
prominent also in the economic literature (Heckman et al., 2006b; Judge and Bono, 2001;
Andrisani, 1977; 1981; Osborne, 2000). Originally, locus of control is a psychological concept,
generally attributed to Rotter (1966), that measures the attitude regarding the nature of
the causal relationship between one’s own behavior and its consequences. In this concept,
which is related to self-efficacy, people who believe that they can control reinforcements in
their lives are called internalizers. People who believe that fate, luck, or other people control
reinforcements, are termed externalizers. Generally, externalizers (in this taxonomy, the low-
1See Gebel and Pfeiffer (2010), Pischke and Von Wachter (2008), Lauer and Steiner (2000), Flossmann
and Pohlmeier (2006) for estimates of returns to education or skills in the German context.
2For an overview of the interrelationships between different psychological and economic concepts, see
Borghans et al. (2008).
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ability types) do not have much confidence in their ability to influence their environment, and
do not see themselves as responsible for their lives. Therefore, these individuals are generally
less likely to trust their own abilities or to push themselves through difficult situations.
Conversely, internalizers (the high-ability types) perceive themselves as more capable of
altering their economic situation.
Mostly on empirical grounds, many studies agree that locus of control affects a variety
of economic choices individuals make (behavioral impact). This is particularly true for ed-
ucation decisions, which most researchers find to be highly influenced by locus of control.3
For instance, Coleman and DeLeire (2003) present a model of locus of control and education
decisions, where locus of control is viewed as a behavioral trait that affects education deci-
sions, because it has an impact on personal beliefs about the effect of education on expected
earnings. Using the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS), the authors find locus
of control to have a high and significant impact on schooling decisions, as well as on ex-ante
expected earnings conditional on schooling. Similarly, recent evidence by Caliendo et al.
(2010) on German unemployment data shows that locus of control is a behavioral trait that
affects the subjective probability of finding a job, which in turn leads to an increased search
effort and higher reservations wages. Contrary to this, using the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth (NLSY), Cebi (2007) concludes that locus of control has a productive impact
on labor market outcomes and no effect on education choices.
Evidence on the effect of locus of control on labor market returns is mixed (productive
impact). For example, Andrisani (1977), using the National Longitudinal Study (NLS),
finds a positive effect of locus of control on several measures of earnings and occupational
attainment of young and middle-aged men. Yet, Duncan and Morgan (1981) find mostly
non-significant effects of locus of control on the change in hourly earnings of individuals in
3Already 40 years ago, the famous Coleman report (Coleman, 1968) reported that locus of control was not
only an important predictor of academic performance, but even a more important determinant of educational
achievement than any other factor in a student’s background (Coleman and DeLeire, 2003).
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the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). To our knowledge, an analysis of the impact of
locus of control on wages using German data has only been conducted by Heineck and Anger
(2010), as well as by Flossmann et al. (2007), with both studies finding positive effects.4 We
add to this literature by using factor structure models to account for measurement error and
endogeneity issues caused by the use of contemporaneous measurements.
3 Empirical Model
Consider a simple model where each individual chooses between obtaining higher education
or not. Premarket locus of control, as imperfectly measured by a set of response variables,
is captured by a latent factor θ, which influences both schooling decisions and labor market
outcomes. The concept of locus of control and its potential impact on education decisions
and labor market outcomes is explained in Section 3.1, while the empirical setup of the model
is detailed in Section 3.2.
3.1 How locus of control impacts education and labor market outcomes
In this section, we present a theoretical framework for how premarket locus of control may
affect labor market returns. We assume that the role of locus of control for wages is poten-
tially twofold. First, it may indirectly affect wages through its effect on education decisions,
and secondly, it may have a direct influence on labor market returns after the education
decision is controlled for.
In our study, locus of control is a latent variable, denoted by θ, that is continuously
distributed in the range (−∞,+∞), where smaller values represent a more external locus
and larger values a more internal locus of control. We assume that an individual’s psychic
costs of education and wage are both functions of θ. Hence, individuals with θ → −∞ are
4Furthermore, Gallo et al. (2003) and Uhlendorff (2004) use German data to investigate the impact of
locus of control on transitions from unemployment to employment.
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likely to have higher psychic costs of education and earn lower wages, while individuals with
θ → +∞ incur lower costs of obtaining a degree and earn more.
In a typical model of human capital investment, individuals decide on the level of ed-
ucation based on the expected returns to the respective choice, net of the costs associated
with this choice. In this framework, locus of control may affect the perceived psychic costs
of education, e.g., because individuals with a more external locus of control believe ex ante
that they would need to work harder than internalizers to feel well-prepared for the exams
(behavioral impact). Furthermore, locus of control may be viewed as a skill with a direct im-
pact on wages, for example because employers value having employees who exhibit a higher
locus of control (productive impact).
Assume that there are two education levels, denoted by S = 0, 1, and that agents max-
imize the latent utility associated with education to make their decision. Let U∗ denote
this latent utility. The arguments of this function will be specified later. Hence, individuals
attend higher education, S = 1, if:
U∗ ≥ 0,
and S = 0 otherwise. The latent utility from obtaining higher education is a function of
discounted future earnings and of education costs. If wages wst in period t conditional on
schooling s, as well as the costs of education C, can all be modeled in an additively separable
manner, we can specify:
w0t = Xwtβ0 + θα0 + ε0t,
w1t = Xwtβ1 + θα1 + ε1t,
C = XCβC + θαC + εC ,
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with E[ε1|Xwt, θ] = E[ε0|Xwt, θ] = E[εC |XC , θ] = 0. Here αs, βs (with s ∈ {0, 1}) and αC , βC
measure the impact of premarket locus of control θ and observable characteristics (Xwt, XC)
on wages and education costs, respectively. Since locus of control is determined before the
individual enters the labor market, it does not depend on time t in our model. Moreover, εst
and εC are random and independent idiosyncratic shocks. The total utility from education,
accounting for the discounted flow of ex post earnings, is then:
U∗(Xw, XC , θ, δ, t1) =
T∑
t=t1
δt (Xwtβ1 + θα1 + ε1t)
−
T∑
t=0
δt (Xwtβ0 + θα0 + ε0t)
− (XCβC + θαC + εC) ,
(3.1)
where Xw = (Xw1, . . . , XwT ), t1 represents the time required to achieve higher education, T
is the life horizon, and δ denotes the discount rate, which for simplicity is assumed to be
constant over time.
By differentiating Equation (3.1) with respect to θ, it appears that a ceteris paribus
change in locus of control affects education decisions as follows:
∂U∗(Xw, XC , θ, t1)
∂θ
= α1
T∑
t=t1
δt − α0
T∑
t=0
δt − αC .
Given that α1 and α0 are independent of t, and making use of revealed education choices, our
goal is to identify α1, α0 and αC . More precisely, we are investigating whether locus of control
enters the education decision and outcomes both directly as a skill, in which case we would
have α1 > 0 and α0 > 0, or only indirectly via the costs of education, in which case αC < 0.
We cannot identify αC directly, because we do not observe education costs. However, we can
make inference on the overall impact of locus of control on education choices, and given the
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identification of α1 and α0, we can retrieve αC . More specifically, if we find that α1 = α0 = 0,
we know that any impact of locus of control on education choices must work through αC .
The empirical model we specify in the next section is an approximation to this very simple
theoretical framework. By combining different subsamples and using revealed schooling
decisions, we are able to identify the impact of premarket locus of control on wages, and
thus to make inferences about its productive or behavioral impact, respectively.
3.2 Specification of the model
To investigate the impact of premarket locus of control on schooling decisions and later
outcomes, we use a factor structure model in the spirit of Heckman et al. (2006b), where a
single latent factor is assumed to capture the latent trait of interest. The overall simultaneous
equation model consists of different sets of equations using continuous, dichotomous and
ordered response variables. The latent factor is common across all equations, and therefore
represents the only source of dependence between the outcomes, conditional on the observed
covariates.
3.2.1 Education decision
Each agent is assumed to choose the level of schooling that maximizes her utility. The
utility derived from higher education S⋆, where higher education is defined as staying in
school beyond compulsory education, is supposed to linearly depend on a vector of personal
characteristics XS and on the latent factor θ:
S = 1l[S⋆ > 0],
S⋆ = XSβS + θαS + εS, εS ∼ N (0; 1) ,
(3.2)
where βS denotes the vector of parameters related to personal characteristics, αS represents
the factor loading associated with θ, and εS is an idiosyncratic error term assumed to be
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independent of the covariates and of the latent factor. The indicator function 1l[·] is equal
to 1 if the corresponding condition is verified, and to 0 otherwise. Conditional on θ, this
model is a standard probit when the distribution of the error term is assumed to be standard
normal.
3.2.2 Labor market outcomes
Individuals with different levels of schooling become active on different segments of the labor
market, where their personal characteristics, as well as their level of locus of control, may
be valued differently. Labor market outcomes are modeled as a two-stage process: people
first select into the labor market, and then a wage equation is estimated for those actually
working. Observed characteristics and locus of control are allowed to play a role in both
stages. Estimating the two equations simultaneously makes it possible to correct for potential
sample selection bias that might affect the parameters if only the wage equation for working
people were estimated (Heckman, 1979).
The labor market participation decision is assumed to be a threshold-crossing model for
each level of education s ∈ {0, 1}, where the latent utility of working (E⋆s ) linearly depends
on a set of covariates XE through a vector of parameters βE,s, and on the latent factor θ
with its associated factor loading αE,s:
Es = 1l[E
⋆
s > 0],
E⋆s = XEβE,s + θαE,s + εE,s, εE,s ∼ N (0; 1) ,
(3.3)
The idiosyncratic error term εE,s is assumed to be standard normal and independent of XE
and θ for identification purposes. Nevertheless, this equation should not be regarded as a
usual employment equation, but rather considered in a broader sense. People participating
in the labor market (E = 1) are those who are actually active and declare a positive wage,
while the group of non-participating people encompasses unemployed people, but also adult
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individuals who are not on the market. Therefore, this equation should be interpreted with
care,5 and serves more as a technical means to tackle the selection problem into the sample
of people declaring a positive wage.
For wages, a log-linear specification with education group specific parameters is assumed:
Ys = XY βY,s + θαY,s + εY,s for s = 0, 1, (3.4)
where Ys represents the log hourly wage (lnws), XY is a set of observed covariates with the
associated vector of returns βY,s, αY,s denotes the return to locus of control, and εY,s is an
idiosyncratic error term such that εY,s ⊥⊥ (θ,XY ). For the specification of the error term,
we relax the usual normality assumption by specifying a mixture of h normal distributions
with zero mean:
εY,s ∼
h∑
j=1
pis,jN
(
µs,j; ω
2
s,j
)
, E[εY,s] =
h∑
j=1
pis,j µs,j = 0, (3.5)
for s = 0, 1, where pis,j, µs,j and ω
2
s,j denote, respectively, the weight, mean and variance
of mixture component j. Mixtures of normals are widely used as a flexible semiparametric
approach for density estimation (Ferguson, 1983; Escobar and West, 1995). In our empirical
application, we find that a three-component mixture (h = 3) for the error term of the wage
equation is crucial to achieve a good fit to our data. It allows us to capture unobserved
heterogeneity that arises because individuals work in different areas or sectors of modern
complex labor markets.6
Within this specification, premarket locus of control can affect labor market outcomes
both directly and indirectly. The direct effect is measured by the factor loadings αE,s and
5Especially for the people who achieve higher education, since in this subsample some individuals who
do not participate in the labor market are still enrolled in the education system.
6In a frequentist approach, Dagsvik et al. (2010) also find that Gaussian mixtures improve the fit of
heavy-tailed log earnings distributions compared to normal distributions.
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αY,s, for s = 0, 1, while the indirect effect operates through the schooling decision. Two
different models are considered. First, we estimate the employment and wage equations
without conditioning on education, to capture the total effect of locus of control on wages.
To achieve this, individuals from both schooling groups are pooled, and the subscript s is
therefore dropped from Equations (3.3) to (3.5). In a second stage, both direct and indirect
effects are separately accounted for by specifying the model as stated above. Comparing the
results from these two approaches turns out to be instructive to understand through which
channels premarket locus of control affects labor market outcomes.
3.2.3 A measurement system for locus of control
In our data, as in most empirical applications, variables measuring latent locus of control
come from a psychometric test using Likert scales with a small number of categories. Al-
though techniques to deal with ordinal variables in a multivariate context have a long history
in statistics and are now well-documented (see Jo¨reskog and Moustaki, 2001, for a survey of
different approaches), a widespread approach in empirical research consists of ignoring ordi-
nality and treating the manifest items as continuous. This can however distort the results in
several ways, especially when the number of categories is limited, and/or the distributions
of the answers show high kurtosis.
In this paper, the ordinal nature of the K measurements is explicitly accounted for by
specifying that each individual has a latent level of agreement M⋆k with the corresponding
statement k of the corresponding test, for k = 1, ..., K. This latent level of agreement is
assumed to linearly depend on some covariates XM and on the factor θ, and is discretized by
a set of cut-points {γk} to produce the observed measurement, with C different alternative
ordered answers as follows:
Mk = c if γk,c−1 ≤ M
⋆
k < γk,c, c = 1, ..., C,
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M⋆k = XMβM,k + θαM,k + εM,k, for k = 1, ..., K, (3.6)
where βM,k denotes the vector of parameters associated with XM , αM,k represents the factor
loading, and the idiosyncratic error term εM,k is assumed to be standard normal and inde-
pendent of θ and XM . Assuming standard normality for the error term is the usual solution
adopted to guarantee invariance of the latent response variable to scale transformation. As
for the cut-points, they are such that γk,0 = −∞ < γk,1 = 0 < ... < γk,C−1 < +∞ = γk,C.
3.2.4 Latent factor for locus of control
To complete the specification of the model, one last distributional assumption is required
for the latent factor θ. In a similar framework, Carneiro et al. (2003), Hansen et al. (2004)
achieve nonparametric identification of the latent factors thanks to some independence and
support assumptions. When the measurement system consists of a combination of discrete
and continuous outcomes, they first nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of the
observed and latent measurements, before turning to the identification of the latent factors
and error terms using a theorem proposed by Kotlarski (1967). In our case, this identification
strategy cannot be applied, insofar as the measurements are all discrete. Nonparametric
identification of the latent factor distribution, as well as of the error term distributions, would
only be possible if we first managed to nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of the
latent measurements. However, the lack of variability and of exclusion restrictions for each
measurement make nonparametric identification and the use of more flexible distributional
assumptions such as mixtures impossible. For these reasons, and for the sake of simplicity,
we specify a normal distribution and make the following independence assumption:
θ ∼ N
(
0; σ2θ
)
, θ ⊥⊥ (X, ε),
where X = (XS, XE, XY , XM) and ε = (εS, {εE,s}, {εY,s}, {εM,k}).
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Since the variance of the latent factor is not constrained, we need to impose one restriction
to set the scale of θ. For this purpose of identification, we fix one of the factor loadings to a
given value in the measurement system.
4 Estimation strategy
In this section, we present the identification strategy that relies on data set combination in
Section 4.1, as well as our estimation method and data in Section 4.2. The parameters of
interest are simulated through the implementation of Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo
techniques.
4.1 Combining data sets to identify the model likelihood
Ideally, we would have access to a data set where individuals are observed at different
periods of their life cycle. The likelihood of the model for such an hypothetical sample can
be expressed as
L(ψ|S,E, Y,M,X) =
∫
Θ
1∏
s=0
[
Pr(S = s|XS, θ, ψ) f(Es|XE , θ, ψ)f(Ys|XY , θ, ψ)
]1l[S=s]
×
K∏
k=1
f(Mk|XM , θ, ψ) dFθ(θ), (4.1)
where ψ represents the vector containing all model parameters, f(·) invariantly denotes a
density function, and Fθ(·) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the latent factor
θ on the support Θ. In our case, this would require information on people’s labor market
outcomes and personal background, as well as on their premarket locus of control. Estimation
based on the likelihood (4.1) would be straightforward.
Unfortunately, the structure of the GSOEP only offers this opportunity for a subsample
of the population, which turns out to be too small to conduct any relevant analysis. Although
the GSOEP is a longitudinal study, youth are surveyed since 2000 only, and many of them still
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have not entered the labor market in 2008. We therefore have to face a major dilemma: on
the one hand, we have a large data set of working-age people (adult sample), but without any
information on their locus of control at the time of schooling. On the other hand, a sample of
17-year-olds is available (youth sample), including premarket locus of control measurements,
but labor market outcomes only for a very small group of mostly low-educated individuals.
The adult and the youth samples can nevertheless be combined to overcome this problem.
We rely on an idea implemented in Cunha et al. (2005), which consists of identifying one
part of the likelihood in each subsample, getting rid of the unobserved response variables by
integrating them out of the likelihood.
To understand the mechanisms of the data set combination, consider the following sketch
of proof. First, derive the contribution to the likelihood of a person with higher education.
Since her future labor market participation and wage cannot be observed, they are integrated
out to provide
∫
Θ
Pr(S = 1|XS, θ, ψ)
{∫∫
f(E1|XE, θ, ψ)f(Y1|XY , θ, ψ) dFE1(E1) dFY1(Y1)
}
×
K∏
k=1
f(Mk|XM , θ, ψ) dFθ(θ)
=
∫
Θ
Pr(S = 1|XS, θ, ψ)
K∏
k=1
f(Mk|XM , θ, ψ) dFθ(θ),
where FW (·) represents the cdf of the corresponding random variable W . As a consequence,
the parameters of the measurement system and of the schooling equation can be identified
from the youth sample. However, due to the small sample size of youth who already earn
a wage on the labor market, identification and estimation of the parameters of the labor
market participation and wage equations from this sample is impossible.
In a similar fashion, consider a person without higher education from the adult sample,
whose measurements for premarket locus of control are not observed. Her contribution to
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the likelihood is
∫
Θ
Pr(S = 0|XS, θ, ψ) f(E0|XE, θ, ψ)f(Y0|XY , θ, ψ)
×
{
K∏
k=1
∫
f(Mk|XM , θ, ψ) dFMk(Mk)
}
dFθ(θ)
=
∫
Θ
Pr(S = 0|XS, θ, ψ) f(E0|XE, θ, ψ)f(Y0|XY , θ, ψ) dFθ(θ),
and is obtained by integrating out the locus of control measures. Full identification of the
model is clearly infeasible in this subsample, since no observations on premarket locus of
control are available for the adults. However, since we are combining the two data sets and
estimating the overall model simultaneously, the distribution of the latent factor is already
identified from the youth sample.
Full identification of the model rests on the education equation, which is the only source
of common information for most of the sample, and therefore the bridge between the two
samples. Although our model can in theory be identified from two non-overlapping samples
of youth and adults, in practice we found it helpful to use all available information—i.e.,
measurement, schooling and labor market information—for the small sample of individuals
for whom both labor market outcomes and locus of control measurements are available.
4.2 Estimation
A fully Bayesian approach is used for the estimation of our model. Since the equations are
independent once θ is conditioned on, the estimation can be divided into several pieces, and
MCMC methods are particularly suited for this kind of problem. In the wake of Cunha et al.
(2005), Carneiro et al. (2003), Hansen et al. (2004), we use a Gibbs sampler that sequentially
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draws the parameters of interest from their respective conditional distributions, using flat
priors to remain as general as possible.7
Data augmentation procedures (Tanner and Wong, 1987) make it possible to simulate the
latent outcomes of the measurement system, of the schooling and labor market participation
equations, as well as the latent factor θ.8 Besides the practical convenience of the approach,
augmenting the observed data with the latent variables has another major advantage in our
case: the simulated latent factors and outcomes can be saved during the sampling process,
and used for post-processing analyses, such as simulations.9 In Section 5.2 for instance, these
simulated variables are used to assess the fit of the model, and to conduct some formal tests.
Bayesian inference for ordinal variable models can be challenging. Slow convergence and
high autocorrelation of the parameter chains are typical symptoms of the algorithm failing
to cover the entire posterior distribution of the parameters. As noted by Cowles (1996),
the high correlation between the cut-points and the latent response variable results in a
poor mixing of the Markov chain for the parameters of Equation (3.6). In the end, this can
lead to overinflated standard errors of the parameters, or even worse, to wrong estimates
(in terms of bias) if the chain is not long enough to provide a representative sample of the
conditional distribution. To remedy this problem, several technical improvements have been
proposed.10 We opt for the group transformation approach introduced by Liu and Sabatti
(2000), which speeds up convergence and enhances the mixing of the chain, while being less
computationally burdensome than other methods. We run a chain of 1,010,000 iterations
for each gender. After a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations, 10,000 iterations are saved
every 100th sweep of the Gibbs sampler for post-processing inference. We observe a fast
7For technical details on the Gibbs sampler in this framework, see Piatek (2010) where all posterior
distributions are derived.
8Data augmentation procedures are increasingly used in applied labor market and education research
(for recent examples see Horny et al., 2009; Koop and Tobias, 2004; Li, 2006).
9See van Dyk and Meng (2001) for a review of data augmentation.
10Cowles (1996) introduces a Hastings-within-Gibbs step in the algorithm to draw the cut-points and the
latent response variable simultaneously, while Nandram and Chen (1996) propose a simple reparameterization
that proves to be particularly effective, especially in the three-category case.
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convergence to the stationary distribution, and a good mixing of the chain thanks to the
implementation of the group transformation.
4.2.1 Sample construction
We draw a combined sample of 1,534 youth (age 17-24) and 1,192 ‘young adults’ (age 26-
35) from recent waves of the GSOEP. The special feature of the youth sample is that for
these youth, premarket measures of locus of control were administered when they were 17
years of age. In the German education system, individuals decide at around the age of 17
whether to finish their studies with a vocational high school certificate, or to continue their
schooling with academic high school credentials. Only the latter entitles agents to attend
higher education. Hence, our binary education variable reflects this choice of obtaining a
vocational or an academic high school degree. Summary statistics of the education variable
in the two samples are presented in Table B.1. For a small part of our youth sample (about
280 individuals), also wage and employment information is available. However, because
these individuals can be at most 24 years of age, most of them did not achieve higher
education. Furthermore, separate estimations by gender and schooling considerably reduce
the available sample size. Hence, as explained in the previous section, we augment the youth
sample with a second sample of young adults, whose education and labor market outcomes
can be assumed to be generated by the same data generating process. Summary statistics
on wages and employment participation of the combined sample can be found in Table B.2.
The table displays that males earn higher wages than females, and that the observed wage
gap between high and low educated individuals is higher for males than for females. The
low levels of labor market participation arise because many individuals still participate in
education or training. To fully account for gender differences in the impact of locus of control
on education decisions and outcomes, all estimates are obtained separately for males and
females.
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In order to be able to identify different parts of the likelihood from different samples,
we make the assumption that both samples are generated by the same underlying data
generating process (DGP). Specifically, we assume that if premarket locus of control and
labor market outcomes were available for both youths and adults, we would expect to obtain
the same estimated coefficients. This assumption is restrictive in the sense that Table B.1
shows that among the youth sample, there is a slightly higher fraction of highly educated
individuals. In order to deal with this problem, we include age and cohort dummies as
covariates in the education, employment and wage equations, so as to capture possible time
trends or cohort effects.
4.2.2 Locus of control measurements
Table 1: Locus of control, youth sample
Males Females
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Q1 My life’s course depends on me 3.55 0.63 3.51 0.59
Q2 I have not achieved what I deserve 2.05 0.85 1.92 0.79
Q3 Success is a matter of fate or luck 2.22 0.81 2.29 0.77
Q4 Others decide about my life 2.18 0.83 2.12 0.83
Q5 Success is a matter of hard work 3.48 0.62 3.51 0.57
Q6 In case of difficulties, doubt about own abilities 2.08 0.81 2.31 0.85
Q7 Possibilities in life depend on social conditions 2.69 0.78 2.72 0.75
Q8 Abilities are more important than effort 3.02 0.71 3.05 0.69
Q9 Little control over what happens to me 1.92 0.75 1.95 0.76
Q10 Social involvement can help influence social conditions 2.48 0.87 2.51 0.77
# Observations 760 774
In the GSOEP youth questionnaire, locus of control is measured by a 10-item question-
naire. Each question is answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“disagree completely”)
to 4 (“agree completely”). Table 1 gives an overview of the questions and items we use.
We check whether, given these measurements, locus of control can indeed be represented
by a single factor. Conducting a principal component analysis, and calculating the eigen-
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values of the correlation matrix, we find two eigenvalues larger than 1. Hence, the Kaiser
criterion (eigenvalue<1) is violated. However, the scree plot analysis displayed in Figure
B.1 reveals an early flattening of the curve, suggesting no more than one or two underlying
factors. Furthermore, locus of control is usually conceptualized as referring to a unidimen-
sional continuum, ranging from external to internal. Hence, we think that we are making
a reasonable decision by extracting a single factor. A scatter plot of the respective factor
loadings (Figure B.2), with the first two principal factors on the axis, shows that some items
load very highly on the extracted locus of control factor (factor 1), while some other items
have a loading close to zero (Q1, Q5, Q8 and Q10). Furthermore, the items with a close
to zero loading are items that capture an internal attitude, while the other items mostly
capture the external dimension of locus of control. Consequently, we can draw two conclu-
sions from this exploratory factor analysis. First, researchers who use an index, constructed
for example as the standardized mean of the items, instead of a latent factor, force each of
the measurement items to enter the index with an equal weight. Doing this yields a locus
of control measure that is flawed by measurement error, and the coefficients are likely to
be biased downward due to attenuation bias. Second, in our paper we mostly capture the
external attitude dimension of locus of control. For ease of interpretation, in our empirical
application we normalize the model such that lower scores of the latent factor are associated
with an external locus of control, and higher scores with an internal locus of control. To
ensure that our results are not distorted by the inclusion of those items that have a low
loading on the locus of control factor, we have conducted robustness checks using only those
items loading highly on the first factor. We find that the use of the externalizing items only
does not have a major impact on the results.11
11Results of the robustness check using only the externalizing items can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
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Table 2: Samples and included covariates for the measurement system,
education, employment and wage equations
Typea Meas. Educ. Empl. Wage
Samples
Youth sample X X (X)b (X)b
Adult sample — X X X
Covariates
Number of siblings D X — — —
% of time in broken family C X X — —
Father dropout B X X X X
Father grammar school B X X X X
Mother dropout B X X — —
Mother grammar school B X X — —
Region: Northc B X X X X
Region: Southc B X X X X
Childhood in large cityd B X X X X
Childhood in medium cityd B X X X X
Childhood in small cityd B X X X X
Track recommendation (highest)e B X — — —
Track recommendation (lowest)e B X — — —
Local unemployment rate C — — X X
Local unemployment rate (edu)f C — X — —
Age of individual C — — X X
Cohort 26/30 B — X — X
Cohort 31/35 B — X — X
Married B — — X X
Number of Children C — — X X
aB = Binary, C = Continuous, D = Discrete.
bOnly a small subsample available for these equations.
cBase category is West Germany.
dBase category is Childhood in countryside.
eBase category is Recommendation for middle track.
fWhen the education decision is made.
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4.2.3 Covariates
Table 2 summarizes the covariates used for our analysis, and also shows how the two samples
are linked by the schooling equation. To account for family background, socioeconomic sta-
tus and labor market conditions, we control for a large range of background variables, as well
as for local unemployment rates at the time of education decisions and labor market out-
comes, respectively. In addition, Germany has an education system where tracking already
takes place after the fourth grade. Hence, to proxy cognitive skills, and to account for the
fact that these cognitive skills might affect the items revealing premarket locus of control,
we include the primary school teacher track recommendation as a control variable in the
measurement system. Because locus of control is estimated from the residual variance net of
covariates in the measurement system, covariates included in the measurement equation are
a means to purge locus of control of their influence. However, the inclusion of track recom-
mendation only proxies cognitive skills and the resulting track type. It cannot account for
other conflicting effects such as school quality. Hence, locus of control, as identified in this
paper, only captures premarket locus of control, and not necessarily pre-compulsory-school
locus of control. Thus we control for track recommendation, parental education and a large
set of other background variables to capture school quality, home investment and cognitive
ability. Summary statistics of control variables in the measurement and outcome equations
can be found in Tables B.3 and B.4.12
5 Empirical results
The results are presented and discussed in two stages. We first provide a description of the
main findings in Section 5.1, with an emphasis on the statistical significance of the impact
of locus of control on the different outcomes, and on the fit of our model. Then, we gain
12A detailed description of the coding of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
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more insights in Section 5.2 by conducting some simulations that make it possible to better
grasp the magnitude of the impact of locus of control.
5.1 MCMC results
Factor loadings. The factor loadings express how the different measurements and out-
comes are affected by the latent factor. The larger the magnitude of the loadings, the higher
the contribution of the corresponding measurements to the distribution of the latent factor.
In the education, employment and wage equations, the loadings measure the impact of the
factor on the respective outcomes. Cross-model comparisons should however be carefully
done: the factor loadings of the different models cannot be directly compared, as their mag-
nitude and their sign depend on the normalization retained to set the scale of the factor.
We normalize the factor loading of the fourth indicator to −1 in all models, which is a way
of anchoring the factor distribution in a real measurement (Cunha and Heckman, 2008).13
However, contrary to Cunha and Heckman (2008), who anchor the factor in earnings, we
cannot give an interpretable metric to the latent factor, because of the ordinal nature of the
measurement. Moreover, the respective item of the questionnaire used for the normalization
might be perceived differently by males and females, and gender comparisons are therefore
not straightforward.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the factor loadings of the different models.
The results of the measurement system are in line with our expectations. Typical questions
associated with an external locus of control such as ‘Success is a matter of fate or luck’
(Q3) or ‘I have not achieved what I deserve’ (Q2) have negative factor loadings, whereas
statements reflecting an internal locus of control, such as ‘My life’s course depends on me’
(Q1), have a positive factor loading. Also, the heterogeneity of these factor loadings is worth
noting, as well as the fact that some of them are not significantly different from zero.
13The fourth indicator is a typical externalizers’ statement, hence the normalization to a negative integer.
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Table 3: Factor loadings of the model estimated by conditioning labor market outcomes on
education [(2) and (4)] and without conditioning on education [(1) and (3)]
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Measurement system: Locus of control items
Q1 0.354∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.364∗∗∗ (0.086) 0.423∗∗∗ (0.095) 0.440∗∗∗ (0.101)
Q2 -0.735∗∗∗ (0.119) -0.729∗∗∗ (0.116) -0.895∗∗∗ (0.132) -0.938∗∗∗ (0.143)
Q3 -0.741∗∗∗ (0.118) -0.743∗∗∗ (0.116) -0.619∗∗∗ (0.107) -0.650∗∗∗ (0.113)
Q4 -1.000 — -1.000 — -1.000 — -1.000 —
Q5 0.013 (0.074) 0.024 (0.075) 0.026 (0.085) 0.025 (0.089)
Q6 -0.640∗∗∗ (0.108) -0.605∗∗∗ (0.102) -0.890∗∗∗ (0.134) -0.916∗∗∗ (0.139)
Q7 -0.559∗∗∗ (0.099) -0.565∗∗∗ (0.099) -0.581∗∗∗ (0.105) -0.617∗∗∗ (0.112)
Q8 -0.195∗∗∗ (0.072) -0.197∗∗∗ (0.072) -0.107∗ (0.078) -0.112∗ (0.082)
Q9 -1.045∗∗∗ (0.175) -1.035∗∗∗ (0.175) -1.781∗∗∗ (0.309) -1.858∗∗∗ (0.332)
Q10 -0.122∗∗ (0.067) -0.140∗∗ (0.068) 0.143∗∗ (0.078) 0.146∗∗ (0.080)
Education choice
S 0.634∗∗∗ (0.134) 0.404∗∗∗ (0.118) 0.444∗∗∗ (0.123) 0.364∗∗∗ (0.127)
Labor market participation
E 0.055 (0.136) -0.021 (0.131)
E0 0.757
∗∗∗ (0.287) 0.357∗∗ (0.222)
E1 -0.126 (0.331) -0.268 (0.286)
log Wages
Y 0.181∗∗∗ (0.041) 0.121∗∗∗ (0.048)
Y0 0.007 (0.060) 0.058 (0.064)
Y1 -0.072 (0.086) 0.020 (0.087)
Variance of the latent factor
σ2
θ
0.635∗∗∗ (0.138) 0.622∗∗∗ (0.135) 0.446∗∗∗ (0.092) 0.411∗∗∗ (0.088)
Notes: Factor loading of item 4 (statement reflecting an external locus of control) fixed to -1 to set the scale of the latent
factor. Standard errors in brackets. Significance check: */**/*** if zero lies outside the 90%/95%/99% confidence interval
of the posterior distribution of the corresponding parameter.
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In the outcome system of equations, the factor loading of the education equation is always
significant and positive, indicating an actual impact of locus of control. When we do not
control for education [columns (1) and (3)], wages appear to be affected by locus of control,
whereas this impact vanishes when education is controlled for [columns (2) and (4)]. Hence,
with respect to the theoretical framework laid out in Section 3.1, we can conclude that the
impact of premarket locus of control on w0t and w
1
t , denoted by α0 and α1 respectively, is
zero. However, we find that locus of control does have an impact on education decisions
(P (S = 1)), and thus on wages in the end. Hence, reverting to Equation (3.1), we can
conclude that locus of control does not affect education decisions via higher expected wages
(α0,α1), but instead through its impact on the cost of education αC .
So far, no firm conclusions have been made as to the magnitude of the impact of locus of
control on education decisions and overall wages. In the following Section 5.2, the simulations
we conduct make it possible to unravel and quantify the actual impact of locus of control on
the different outcomes of interest.
Model fit to actual data. Our model provides a good fit to the data, and especially to
the distribution of wages. Figure 1 displays the observed distribution of wages, along with
their posterior predictive distribution for the different specifications. The actual distribution
is quite well approximated by the posterior predictive distribution, particularly in the case
where the two schooling groups are pooled for the estimation of the wage equation (panels 1a
and 1b). When the wage equation is estimated by level of schooling (panels 1c, 1d , 1e and
1f), the fit is somewhat less good. Nevertheless, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests we conduct
to compare the actual distribution and the posterior predictive distribution never reject the
null hypothesis of equal distribution. This result is in great part due to the use of normal
mixtures for the error term, allowing for a flexible approximation of the true distribution.
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Figure 1: Goodness-of-fit check for wages: posterior predictive (dashed) vs. actual distri-
bution (solid) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equal distributions.
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(a) Males, all education levels
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(b) Females, all education levels
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(c) Males, no higher education
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(d) Males, with higher education
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(e) Females, no higher education
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(f) Females, with higher education
Notes: Model estimated by conditioning labor market outcomes on education (panels 1c to 1f) and without conditioning on
education (panels 1a and 1b). Kernel density estimation implemented using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth selected using
Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986) with the variation proposed by Scott (1992). Wages predicted from their posterior
distribution using 1,000 replications of the sample. Shaded area represents 95% confidence interval of posterior predictive
distribution. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: Two-sample KS-test with null hypothesis that the actual sample and the posterior
predictive sample have the same distribution. p-values in brackets. Exact p-values could not be computed due to ties in the
distribution of actual wages.
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Figure 2: Latent factor distribution by levels of education: people with higher education
(S = 1) and without higher education (S = 0).
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
factor
de
ns
ity
S = 0
S = 1
KS-test: 0.298 (0.000)
(a) Males
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
factor
de
ns
ity
S = 0
S = 1
KS-test: 0.242 (0.000)
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 1,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated without
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. Predicted levels of education used (Pr(S = 1) > .5). Kernel density
estimation implemented using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth selected using Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986)
with the variation proposed by Scott (1992). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: Two-sample KS-test with null hypothesis that the two
distributions are the same. p-values in brackets. Exact p-values could not be computed due to ties in the distribution of the
latent factor.
To assess the goodness of fit to the education decision, Table 4 shows the proportion of
correct predictions of education achievement for each decile of the latent factor distribution.
The fit appears good overall, especially for the lower deciles of the distribution.
5.2 Simulation of the model
To shed more light on the implications of our model, we need to go beyond the mere inter-
pretation of the factor loadings. Their statistical significance reveals an impact of locus of
control on the outcomes, but is quite uninformative regarding the magnitude of this impact
(McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). Since the effects of premarket
locus of control are intertwined and potentially operate through different channels on wages,
the best way to understand our model is to simulate it.
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Table 4: Goodness-of-fit check: proportion of correct predictions of education achievement for each decile of
the latent factor distribution
Deciles of latent factor distribution
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Males
(1) 0.827 0.816 0.804 0.785 0.764 0.737 0.708 0.673 0.645 0.699
(0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044)
(2) 0.788 0.785 0.777 0.762 0.745 0.728 0.711 0.691 0.671 0.669
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Females
(3) 0.771 0.746 0.728 0.714 0.702 0.689 0.677 0.667 0.667 0.692
(0.033) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040)
(4) 0.756 0.736 0.722 0.709 0.698 0.689 0.678 0.666 0.659 0.675
(0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Notes: Model estimated by conditioning labor market outcomes on education [(2) and (4)] and without conditioning [(1) and (3)]. Proportions of
correct predictions computed for each MCMC replication, corresponding means and standard errors (in brackets) are reported.
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Figure 3: Probability of achieving higher education for each decile of the factor distribution
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(b) Females
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% confidence band between dashed lines.
Figure 2 plots the estimated posterior distribution of the latent factor by levels of ed-
ucation, and shows that people who achieve higher education have a more internal locus
of control. For males, the gap between the two schooling groups is even wider, revealing
some gender differences in the way locus of control influences education decisions. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that the discrepancy between the two distributions is
statistically significant for both genders.
To get more insight on the impact of premarket locus of control on later outcomes, we
can investigate how the wage of a given individual would be affected if she were exogenously
moved along the distribution of the latent factor, for a given set of observed characteristics
XY (Heckman et al., 2006b). For this purpose, we compute the expected wage for different
quantiles of the distribution of the factor, conditional on a given set of covariates XY . The
Gibbs algorithm we implement to estimate our model generates a sample of the model
parameters from their conditional distribution that can be used as follows to approximate
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Figure 4: Probability of labor market participation for people without higher education for
each decile of the factor distribution
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% confidence band between dashed lines.
the expected wage for each quantile qθ of the factor distribution:
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
XY β
(m)
Y + q
(m)
θ α
(m)
Y
)
,
for a set of M simulated parameters (β
(1)
Y , α
(1)
Y ), . . . , (β
(M)
Y , α
(M)
Y ). The quantile of the la-
tent factor q
(m)
θ also has a superscript (m), since it depends on the variance of the factor
σ
2(m)
θ , and therefore varies during the MCMC sampling. Similarly, the schooling and labor
market participation probabilities in the qth quantile of the latent factor distribution can be
approximated by:
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
XSβ
(m)
S + q
(m)
θ α
(m)
S
)
,
1
M
M∑
m=1
Φ
(
XEβ
(m)
E + q
(m)
θ α
(m)
E
)
,
respectively, where Φ(·) denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. More specifi-
cally, the simulations we present rely on the deciles of the distribution. In the following, our
simulations are performed for the mean individual of the corresponding sample.
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Figure 5: Mean log wage for each decile of the factor distribution
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(b) Females
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated without
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% confidence band between dashed lines.
From Figure 3, locus of control appears to have a large impact on the schooling decision,
since moving the mean individual from the first to the last decile of the distribution results
in a 0.30 point increase in the probability of achieving higher education for males, and a 0.23
point increase for females. Similarly, Figure 4 shows that in the group of people who did not
achieve higher education, locus of control has a huge impact on labor market participation.
This effect is more or less linear for females, whereas for males the concavity of the curve
indicates that people in the low deciles are more affected than people in the higher deciles
of the distribution. Concerning wages, Figure 5 shows that if the mean individual could be
moved exogenously from the first to the 9th decile of the locus of control distribution, this
would corresponds to an increase in hourly wages of roughly 4.40 Euros for the mean male
individual, and of roughly 2.20 Euros for the mean female individual.
At first sight, the effect of locus of control on education choice and labor market outcomes
seems large. For instance, the mean male individual would earn 36% more in the last decile
than in the first one. However, it is unrealistic to see an individual move all the way across
the distribution. People are more likely to make small moves from one decile to the adjacent
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ones, and Figures 3 to 5 show that in the middle of the distribution, the locus of control
effect is much smaller.
5.3 Some remarks on the results
In summary, we find an effect of locus of control on schooling probabilities, where males
are more affected than females. Moving the mean individual in the distribution of the
latent factor substantially changes her/his wage. However, this overall effect only operates
through the channel of schooling. This finding that premarket locus of control influences
schooling is in line with Coleman and DeLeire (2003), although in their paper the mechanism
through which locus of control affects schooling is different, as it only works through wage
expectations.
Our results seem somewhat contrary to the more direct link between locus of control and
wages that been found in some of the literature (Heckman et al., 2006b; Heineck and Anger,
2010). Three different answers can be put forward to address this apparent contradiction.
First, the term ‘noncognitive skills’ is very often used as a generic expression encompassing
a lot of different personal abilities and traits, sometimes leading to confusion. A compar-
ison of results is possible only if the same concept is used. For instance, Heckman et al.
(2006b) find a significant effect of noncognitive skills on wages. However, they use a single
underlying factor for noncognitive skills constructed from two psychometric tests, namely
the Rosenberg self-esteem scale and the Rotter scale. This composite factor thus captures
a different dimension than our factor, especially since it loads more on the self-esteem scale
than on the locus of control scale in their empirical study. Second, and more importantly,
we focus on premarket locus of control as a measure of locus of control that is independent
of labor market experience. As a consequence, our findings differ from the results presented
by Heineck and Anger (2010) who find a strong and significant impact of locus of control
on wages, even after controlling for education. One reason could be that the authors do not
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estimate separate models by education level. More likely, however, the difference in results
arises because of the use of contemporaneous measurements in their study, while we focus
on the impact of premarket locus of control. Third, we only look at a sample of young labor
market entrants. At this stage, wage setting is likely to be merely a function of formal qual-
ifications. Hence, only after individuals have entered the labor market, a complex dynamic
interaction process begins. While working on-the-job, individuals learn about their abilities,
while at the same time employers adapt their knowledge about an individual’s locus of con-
trol. As a result, a positive interdependence between locus of control and wages may arise
(such as the one found by Heineck and Anger, 2010). Additional analyses not displayed in
this paper show that the correlation between locus of control and wages does indeed increase
with age and experience of the agents. Whether this is the result of reverse causality or
learning of employers is an interesting topic left for future research. One explanation may
be that although early locus of control does not influence wages directly, it may influence
late locus of control which in turn is directly rewarded on the labor market. We leave it
for future research to find out whether there exists a constant and invariable component to
personality traits in general, and to locus of control in particular. Such a component may be
extracted using dynamic factor models, and would require repeated measurements of locus
of control over large parts of the life-cycle.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use Bayesian factor structure models to investigate how locus of control
influences education decisions and wages. Using advanced econometric methods, we show
that such recent methods can serve as a solution measurement error and endogeneity prob-
lems, especially if researchers are confronted with truncated life cycle data, as is very often
the case for research at the intersection of psychology and economics.
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We establish that an individual’s premarket locus of control substantially raises the prob-
ability of choosing higher education. We also show that locus of control influences wages
through schooling, but that there is no direct impact on wages once schooling is controlled
for. Thus, in a framework where schooling decisions depend on relative lifetime earnings
returns for each schooling level, net of the costs of obtaining either level of education, we
can infer from our results that premarket locus of control, as measured at the age of 17, is
not directly rewarded as a skill on the labor market. Instead, it is a personality trait that
influences the non-pecuniary costs of education.
Our work conveys important policy implications. If some personality traits, such as
locus of control, influence the cost of education but not outcomes directly, these individual
characteristics may keep individuals from studying who, once they reach the labor market,
are no less successful than other individuals. If these individuals are at high risk of dropping
out of school, early personality tests and targeted mentoring of students with an external
locus of control are a means to countervail skill shortages in society.
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Appendix A Data addendum
Our data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative longitu-
dinal micro-dataset that contains a wide range of socio-economic information on individuals
in Germany, comprising follow-ups for the years 1984-2008. Information was first collected
from about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents in West Germany in 1984. After
German reunification in 1990, the GSOEP was extended to around 4,500 persons from East
Germany, and subsequently supplemented and expanded by additional samples. The data
are well-suited for our analysis in that they allow us to exploit information on a wide range
of background variables, locus of control and wages, for a representative panel of individuals.
Furthermore, the inclusion of a special youth survey, comprising information on 17-year-olds,
allows us to obtain background variables and locus of control measures for individuals who
have not yet entered the labor market.
A.1 Combining samples
Our focus is to analyze the impact of locus of control and to purge our estimates of mea-
surement error and endogeneity problems. Hence, to investigate how locus of control affects
schooling decisions and wages, respectively, we would ideally need a sample of individuals
for whom locus of control measures are collected at several points in time: first, at the time
when individuals make education decisions, and second, at a time just before they start
the respective job for which labor market returns can be observed. In this way, we would
obtain locus of control measures that are truly exogenous, and not influenced by previous
on-the-job labor market experience. However, we only have access to one measure of what
we term ‘premarket’ locus of control. This measure is taken when individuals are 17 years
of age, just after compulsory schooling, but before they enter the labor market.14 We then
14Locus of control measures have also been collected for a cross section of young adults in 2007, but we
disregard this information, as we suspect it to be flawed by previous labor market experience.
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combine the sample of youth for which we have ‘premarket’ locus of control measures with a
sample of young adults for whom we observe labor market outcomes. We draw our samples
on the basis of selection criteria that are explained in the following.
A.1.1 Youth sample
Our youth sample is composed of 1,534 individuals born between 1984 and 1991, all of which
are children of GSOEP panel members. A comprehensive set of background variables, school-
ing choices, as well as locus of control measures of these individuals, have been collected in
the years 2001-2008, when the subjects were 17 years of age. After the first interview at age
17, all subjects are subsequently interviewed on a yearly basis until early adulthood. For
example, in 2008, the oldest youth are 24 years of age. An exception to the age rule was
made for the 2001 wave, such that some subjects were already 18 or 19 years of age when
first completing the questionnaire. We exclude these individuals from our sample. Besides,
to ensure that our results are not flawed by post 1991 schooling and labor market adjust-
ments, all individuals who went to school in East Germany (the former German Democratic
Republic) have been excluded. Last, we exclude all individuals with missing locus of control
measures, missing schooling information, or missing information among the covariates.
A.1.2 Adult sample
The adult sample used for our analysis comprises information on 1,192 individuals, aged
26-35, who are drawn from all West German representative subsamples We construct a
cross-section of individuals based on the most recent information available from the waves
2004-2008. Hence, most of our information on the adult sample stems from the 2008 wave.
However, if some important pieces of information on certain individuals in that wave are
missing, they are filled up with information from 2007. If the information in the 2007 wave
is also missing, information from 2006 is used, and so on.
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We want to ensure that labor market outcomes and cognitive measures are not related
to language problems, post 1991 adjustments, or discrimination. Hence, we exclude non-
German citizens, individuals who did not live in West Germany at the time of reunification,
as well as individuals whose parents do not speak German as a mother tongue. We also
exclude handicapped individuals and individuals in vocational training. Furthermore, we
exclude individuals with missing schooling information, because the schooling equation is
crucial as it links our two samples and ensures identification. Also, individuals with missings
among the control variables are dropped from the sample.
A.2 ‘Premarket’ locus of control
In the GSOEP, locus of control is measured by a 10-item questionnaire. However, the number
of possible answers differs between the years 2001-2005, where a 7-point scale was used,
and the years 2006-2008, where a 4-point item scale was used. To make the questionnaire
comparable across samples, we transform the 7-point scale into a 4-point scale by assigning
the middle category (4) either to category 2 or 3 of the 4-item scale, depending on the
most probable answer. For example, if in the 2005 sample most youth answered “completely
agree,” people who answered “indifferent” in the 2006 sample are assumed to tend toward the
“slightly agree” answer. After transforming answers to have the same scale, each question is
answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (“completely disagree ”) to 4 (“completely agree”).
A.3 Schooling choice
We group schooling into two broad categories: higher education and lower education. Indi-
viduals are classified as being highly educated whenever they have some kind of academic
qualification. That is, to qualify as highly educated, individuals need to have passed at
least those exams that mark the completion of secondary schooling, and which are obtained
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in tracks with an academic orientation (German high school diploma (Abitur) obtained ei-
ther at Gymnasium or Gesamtschule). To identify the level of schooling obtained, we use
the international Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN)
Classification, which is a generated variable available in the GSOEP. We define individu-
als as being highly educated when their attained education level corresponds to CASMIN
categories (2c, 3a, 3b). Similarly, individuals are low-educated if their education status is
classified according to CASMIN classification categories (1b, 1c, 2a, 2b). Furthermore, for a
subsample of youth who have not completed their education at the time of the last interview,
we replace their final education status with their aspired (planned) level of education.
A.4 Wage construction and labor market participation
Wages are constructed by using most recent wage information available from the GSOEP.
Whenever occurring, missing wage information was substituted by wage information ob-
tained in one of the earlier years. Wages have been inflation adjusted to match 2008 wage
levels (inflation rates obtained from Eurostat). Wages are assigned a missing whenever the
respective individual is indicating not to have a regular (full time or part time) job. We
exclude other types of employment such as marginal employment, to ensure that we are not
including typical student jobs.
Hourly wages have been constructed by dividing gross monthly wages by the actual
number of hours worked in the last month before the interview. Log hourly wages are
then obtained by taking the natural logarithm of the hourly wage variable. To account for
outliers, we trim hourly wages below the first and above the ninety ninth percentiles. All
individuals who indicate a positive wage and are full- or part-time employed are classified
as labor market participants.
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A.5 Covariates
In our measurements system, schooling equation and outcome equations, we control for
a large set of background variables. The locus of control factor distribution is identified
from the covariance structure of the unobservables of the model. Hence, any controls in the
measurement system purge our measures of locus of control of any effects which are captured
by the covariates. Thus, the covariates in place should be uncorrelated with the latent trait
we want to capture, since in our model the latent factor has to be uncorrelated with these
covariates by construction. In the following, a brief description of the different categories of
covariates is provided.
A.5.1 Parental education and investment
Parental education variables have been constructed in the form of dummy variables for higher
secondary degree (German Gymnasium), lower secondary degree (German Hauptschule or
Realschule), dropout and other degree. This information was collected using the Biography
Questionnaire, which every person answers when she is first interviewed in the GSOEP.
Apart from parental education, Parental investment is proxied by two variables: broken
home and number of siblings. Our broken home variable reflects the percentage of childhood
time spent in a broken home until the age of 15. This information was also obtained from
the Biography Questionnaire. Last, the number of siblings is obtained for the youth by
counting the number of siblings living in the household. If an individual has many brothers
and sisters, this may indicate that parental time is spread among more individuals, and that
overall parental investment is lower.
A.5.2 Region dummies and city size
Because school quality and availability, culture and incomes may vary between large and
small municipalities, we control for the size of the city where agents spent most of their
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childhood. Hence, we specify dummy variables for large city, medium city, small city and
countryside. Furthermore, we specify four region variables to represent the current region of
residence. Hereby, the German La¨nder are classified as follows:
• North: Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein,
• South: Bavaria, Baden-Wu¨rttemberg,
• West: Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland,
• East: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia.
A.5.3 Unemployment rates
We construct unemployment rates at two different points in time. First, we use overall
German unemployment at the time when individuals are 17, to have a rough measure of the
business cycle when schooling decisions are made. Second, we use region (La¨nder) specific
unemployment rates at the time when labor market outcomes are observed. The latter
are important to explain the participation decision, as well as local wage rates. All local
unemployment rates are obtained from the Federal Employment Office (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit), and overall unemployment from the German Federal Statistical Agency (Bundesamt
fu¨r Statistik).
A.5.4 Marital status and number of children
We construct a dummy variable for whether someone is married by looking at her current
marital status. Furthermore, we identify the number of dependent children by counting all
children for which child benefit payments (Kindergeld) are received by the household. These
variables are important, because previous studies show that being married and the number
of dependent children have a positive impact on labor market participation and wages for
males, and a negative one for females (see, e.g., Hill, 1979, among others).
46
A.5.5 Track recommendation after elementary school
We acknowledge that both schooling decisions and locus of control measures may be corre-
lated with cognitive skills. Hence, in order to proxy cognitive skills, and to account for the
fact that schooling decisions may depend on prior track attendance, we include an individ-
ual’s track recommendations after elementary school. In Germany, track recommendations
are given to every student during 4th grade by their elementary school teachers. In some of
the German La¨nder, track recommendations are non-mandatory (but generally adhered to).
In some other La¨nder, track recommendations are compulsory.
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Appendix B Descriptive statistics
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Scree plots
Figure B.1: Scree plot: all measurements versus 6 ‘external’ items only
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Loadings plots
Figure B.2: Scatterplot of loadings: all measurements versus 6 ‘external’ items only
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Table B.1: Proportion of people with higher education (all samples)
Variables Mean SD N
Females (youth sample) 0.518 0.500 774
Males (youth sample) 0.459 0.499 760
Females (adult sample) 0.461 0.499 592
Males (adult sample) 0.368 0.483 600
Table B.2: Descriptive statistics: labor market outcomes by schooling
High education Low education
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N p-value
Labor market participation (males) 0.49 0.50 472 0.71 0.45 617 0.00
Hourly wage (males) 16.03 7.16 228 11.58 4.67 435 0.00
Labor market participation (females) 0.49 0.50 553 0.58 0.49 558 0.00
Hourly wage (females) 12.89 4.86 269 10.35 4.00 316 0.00
Source: GSOEP, cross section using most recent information from the waves 2004-2008. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for differences in means are reported.
Table B.3: Descriptive statistics: covariates in the measurement
system
Males Females
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Childhood in large city 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Childhood in medium city 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.40
Childhood in small city 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.44
North 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
South 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47
Recommendation: grammar school 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50
Recommendation: general secondary school 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
Number of siblings 0.98 1.27 1.01 1.22
Broken home 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43
Father grammar school 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47
Father dropout 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19
Mother grammar school 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44
Mothers dropout 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16
# Observations 760 774
Source: GSOEP, cross section using most recent information from the waves 2004-2008. Own
calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for differences in means are reported.
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Table B.4: Descriptive statistics: covariates in the outcome equations (by schooling)
Males Females
High education Low education High education Low eduction
Variables Mean SD Mean SD p-val Mean SD Mean SD p-val
Age 24.96 5.88 26.52 5.53 0.00 25.31 5.86 25.82 5.50 0.14
Broken home 0.14 0.35 0.18 0.39 0.07 0.17 0.37 0.22 0.41 0.03
Father grammar school 0.44 0.50 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.41 0.49 0.08 0.28 0.00
Father dropout 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.00
Mother grammar school 0.33 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.30 0.46 0.08 0.27 0.00
Mother dropout 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.06
Childhood in large city 0.24 0.43 0.18 0.38 0.01 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.71
Childhood in medium city 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.58 0.23 0.42 0.18 0.38 0.03
Childhood in small city 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.42 0.29 0.25 0.44 0.25 0.43 0.77
North 0.24 0.43 0.21 0.41 0.25 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 0.27
South 0.31 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.58 0.28 0.45 0.34 0.47 0.06
Unemployment at schooling decision 9.01 1.30 8.93 1.37 0.35 9.03 1.39 9.03 1.34 0.97
Unemployment 7.47 2.90 7.72 3.25 0.18 7.70 3.06 7.52 3.12 0.33
Married 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.42 0.01 0.18 0.38 0.27 0.45 0.00
Number of children 1.03 1.12 0.79 1.01 0.00 0.96 1.17 0.92 1.12 0.55
# Observations 472 617 553 558
Source: GSOEP, cross section using most recent information from the waves 2004-2008. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for differences in means are reported.
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